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The federal courts of appeals increasingly hear cases that have
scientific or highly technical content. This is particularly true of the
Federal Circuit, because of its jurisdiction over patent cases, and of
the D.C. Circuit, because of its review of agency rulemakings and
adjudications.' Many of these complex cases pose a significant
challenge for generalist judges, who typically lack scientific or
technical expertise.
The challenge of understanding such cases has led some prominent
observers to call for the use of independent expert witnesses or,
alternatively, expert staff members to assist the courts of appeals as
needed. Perhaps because the use of court-appointed experts in the
federal district courts has not proved controversial, the idea of
appointing independent experts to assist appellate courts has
resurfaced in a serious fashion. Under this proposal, neutral staff or
t Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. This Article is based
upon remarks presented at the Dean Lindsey Cowen Business Law Lecture on April 4, 2007 at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law.
I The D.C. Circuit is the venue for 54% of all administrative appeals in federal courts
nationwide, excluding appeals from the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Internal Revenue
Service, and the National Labor Relations Board. See Administrative Agency, Bankruptcy
Cases, and Original Proceedings Commenced, by Circuit for the Twelve Month Period Ended
December 31, 2007 (on file with author). If one focuses upon agencies engaged in scientific and
technical analyses, the D.C. Circuit's share is higher still; approximately 67% of appeals from
the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Communications Commission, and the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission are heard there. See id
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outside independent experts would advise judges ex parte and their
advice would not be reflected in the record, save perhaps in the
opinion of the court.
In my view, it would be a mistake for the federal courts of appeals
to retain or consult experts for five reasons. First, the practice is
inconsistent with the adversary system. Second, it may cause the
judiciary subtly to transfer to the independent expert its non-delegable
duty and authority under Article III of the Constitution of the United
States to decide cases and controversies.2 Third, in administrative
review cases, which tend to be the most challenging in terms of
scientific and technical subject matter, it would undercut the courts'
appropriate deference to agency expertise. Fourth, it would sacrifice
the virtues of a generalist judiciary. Finally, the practice would be
unworkable. Before laying out these objections in greater detail, I
discuss the technical challenges faced by judges and the proposals
they have elicited that the courts of appeals rely upon independent
experts.
I. THE INFORMATION JUDGES NEED
Under the hard look doctrine, which originated in the D.C. Circuit
in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a court, in reviewing agency
decision making, performs a "searching and careful" inquiry into
whether the agency's "decision was based on a consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment"
but does not "substitute its judgment for that of the agency."4 This
inquiry often forces a judge to evaluate significant technical
complexities.
Consider the antitrust case United States v. Microsoft Corp.
Although it did not involve review of administrative action, the case
is a good example of the difficult technical questions generalist
judges may face. A key issue-which, for people under thirty, may
not seem challenging, but for the average judge is a bit more
daunting-was the extent to which Microsoft's Web browser, Internet
Explorer, was so bound to its Windows operating system that it could
not be removed without crippling the operating system.6 If Internet
2 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, 1.
3 See, e.g., Patrick M. Garry, Judicial Review and the "Hard Look" Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J.
151, 157 (2006); Reuel E. Schiller, Rulemaking's Promise: Administrative Law and Legal
Culture in the 1960s and 1970s, 53 ADMIN. L. REv. 1139, 1155-66 (2001).
4 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971), abrogated
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
5 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
6 See id. at 64-67.
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Explorer was in fact inextricably bound to the Windows operating
system, then computer hardware manufacturers such as IBM and Dell
would have little incentive to pre-install another Internet browser,
namely Netscape Navigator, on their machines, nor would consumers
have much incentive, after purchasing a new computer, to purchase or
download and to install that browser.
Other examples abound. Recently, a panel of the D.C. Circuit
reviewed regulations of the Mine Safety and Health Administration
that limited concentration levels for diesel particulate matter in
underground mines. Although the court, sensitive to the agency's
comparative expertise and to its own limitations, explained that it
would "give an extreme degree of deference to the agency when ...
'evaluating scientific data within [the agency's] technical expertise,"'
it still had to examine the agency's scientific explanations closely for
reasonableness.9 The court therefore considered, among other issues,
whether the agency had shown diesel particulate matter poses a
significant risk to miners' health; whether the proxies the agency had
used to set the standard were sufficiently accurate surrogates for
diesel particulate matter; and whether the standard was one feasible of
achievement in the circumstances of an underground mine.o
In another recent case, the D.C. Circuit reviewed a rule issued by
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration governing the
number of hours that truckers could work and drive in seven and in
eight consecutive days." In that case, the court vacated the rule
because the agency failed sufficiently to consider the effect the rule
would have upon the health of the drivers. 12 The court also expressed
concern with the agency's justifications for other aspects of the rule.'3
For example, the court questioned the agency's decision to increase
the maximum daily driving time to eleven from ten hours in light of
statistical evidence that crash risks increase dramatically as driving
hours increase after the eighth hour. 14 Although the agency cited
several studies and its own cost-benefit analysis, the court noted that
the agency had failed to explain how the cited studies justified the
increase and that the cost-benefit analysis failed to account for fatigue
I See id.
8 See Kennecott Greens Creek Mining Co. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 476 F.3d
946,952-60 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
9 Id. at 954-55 (quoting Hils Am., Inc. v. Browner, 83 F.3d 445, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
10 Id. at 952.
11 See Pub. Citizen v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 374 F.3d 1209, 1212 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
12 See id. at 1216-17.
13 See id. at 1217-23.
14 Id. at 1217-19.
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generated by time on task.15 The court was also dubious about the
agency's justification for allowing a driver using a sleeper berth-a
compartment in the truck where a driver can sleep-to split an
otherwise continuous ten-hour rest period; the cited studies did not
seem to support the agency's conclusion. 16 These were issues as to
which there was a plethora of sometimes conflicting scientific and
statistical evidence, all beyond the ordinary experience of the court.
The decision of the Supreme Court in Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns,17 which reversed the decision of the D.C. Circuit in
American Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA," is best known for confirming the
rumored death of the nondelegation doctrine. 9 But on remand from
the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit still needed to consider whether,
for example, it was arbitrary and capricious for the EPA to select a
relatively stringent annual standard and a relatively lax daily standard
for particulate matter2o and for the EPA to choose 0.08 parts per
million as the appropriate National Ambient Air Quality Standard for
ozone, as opposed to 0.09 or 0.07, the alternative levels considered by
the agency. 21 Again, included in the record were various scientific
studies and analyses,22 and the panel needed to determine whether
they supported the agency's position.23
In these cases and in others like them, it is not uncommon for the
joint appendix filed with the court-the appendix that brings to the
court the documents and the part of the rulemaking record that the
parties think are most relevant to the issues on review-to be four,
five, six or eight volumes and to stack up to two feet.24 Of course, the
joint appendix is only a fraction of the full record, more of which the
court may need to examine in certain cases. Former Chief Judge
Patricia Wald of the D.C. Circuit described just how bad it can get:
15 Id. at 1218-19.
16 See id. at 1219-20.
17 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
18 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that the EPA's interpretation of the Clean Air
Act, upon which the EPA had relied to revise National Ambient Air Quality Standants for
particulate matter and ozone, created an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power), rev'd
sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
19 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473-76 (rejecting the D.C. Circuit's holding that the EPA's
interpretation of the Clean Air Act violated the nondelegation doctrine).
20 See Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 372-75 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
21 See id. at 379-80.
22 See id. at 365, 376-77.
2 See id. at 373-74, 379-80.
24 I recently heard a case, Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA, 489 F.3d 1364
(D.C. Cir. 2007), the materials for which filled a box that had formerly held ten reams of
paper-5,000 pages.
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In Sierra Club [v. Costle], the D.C. Circuit was faced with a
record of several thousand pages, twelve volumes of
appendices, eight hundred pages of briefs and a
forty-five-page, three-column, single-spaced statement of the
agency's rationale. The case raised highly complex questions,
such as the "technological feasibility" of meeting a
ninety-percent sulfur dioxide reduction standard in coal
burned in utility plants. Neither I nor the law clerk who
worked on the case had any technical background in
antipollution equipment or coal mining. As a result, we
suffered through endless hours of deciphering innumerable
designs of electrostatic precipitators, baghouses, etc. We
agonized over statistical projections and even discovered a
number of mathematical miscalculations in the agency's own
rationale. We sent out a supplemental interrogatory
requesting additional data on a technical point, the variability
of scrubber performance at a particular plant. Although we
asked for a "brief memorandum," we received in reply
approximately 150 pages of explanation. At times we were
overwhelmed and insecure, isolated in two rooms, surrounded
by mountains of documents.2 5
From time to time, many associates in law firms surely feel the same
way Judge Wald did. With seniority, they may grow out of it-but the
judges will not.
II. INDEPENDENT EXPERTS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
The idea of government by experts stems from the Progressive
movement of roughly the 1880s to the 1920s. Progressives viewed the
judiciary, and government generally, as encrusted with inefficient and
vestigial practices.2 6 As the Progressives sought to make government
more efficient, there was a parallel movement toward "scientific
management" in business; managers of factories conducted time and
motion studieS27 and experimented with altering working conditionS28
2 Patricia M. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of Columbia Circuit,
50 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 135, 145 (1982). The case to which Judge Wald refers, Sierra Club v.
Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981), involved the D.C. Circuit's review of the EPA's decision
to promulgate new source performance standards governing coal-burning power plant
emissions.
26 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration
of Justice, 40 AM. L. REV. 729, 742 (1906) (calling the American court system "archaic"
because of the organization of the courts and the significant time, expense, and uncertainty they
engendered).
27 See FREDERICK WINSLOW TAYLOR, THE PRINCIPLES OF SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT
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in order to determine the most efficient methods of production. In
general it was thought the "scientific"-in this context meaning
systematic-study of any social problem would enable experts to
discover the one best solution. 2 9 This is also the principle that brought
us eugenics, public housing, and many other such disasters.30
In the Progressive Era, experts in various fields, particularly in the
sciences (both physical and social), were drawn into government at all
levels to an unprecedented degree. To give a prominent example, the
Congress established the United States Forest Service in 1905 and
President Theodore Roosevelt appointed Gifford Pinchot, the most
prominent advocate of scientific forestry and the person generally
regarded as the father of American conservation,3 1 to be the first chief
of the Service.32
Against that background, it is not surprising that many judges and
lawyers began to believe the business of the federal courts-
particularly the trial courts-could be improved with expert help.
Learned Hand, a great judge in his time, wrote an article in the
Harvard Law Review in 1901 in which he said that in any case
requiring "specialized and scientific knowledge," there should be "a
board of experts or a single expert, not called by either side, [to]
advise the jury of the general propositions applicable to the case
66-68, 84-86 (1911).
28 See, e.g., G.A. Pennock, Industrial Research at Hawthorne: An Experimental
Investigation of Rest Periods, Working Conditions and Other Influences, 8 PERSONNEL J. 296
(1930); see also Richard Herbert Franke & James D. Kaul, The Hawthorne Experiments: First
Statistical Interpretation, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 623, 624 (1978) (providing statistical analysis
regarding the effect of certain working conditions on worker performance).
29 See SAMUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFr: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920, at ix-xii, 102-16 (1964) (explaining the role of the scientific
expert in improving efficiency); Eliza Wing-yee Lee, Political Science, Public Administration,
and the Rise of the American Administrative State, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 538, 542-43 (1995)
(discussing the important role of science and scientific management in public administration and
policy development).
3 See, e.g., DONALD K. PICKENS, EUGENICS AND THE PROGRESSIVES (1968) (detailing the
relationship between the development of eugenics and the Progressive movement in America).
31 See SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFICIENCY 28-29 (1959)
(discussing Pinchot's impact on American forestry); George A. Gonzalez, The Conservation
Policy Network, 1890-1910: The Development and Implementation of "Practical" Forestry, 31
POLITY 269, 274-77 (1998) (describing Pinchot's application of his European studies in forestry
in America). But see id at 280 (identifying other, possibly more accomplished, experts in the
field).
32 See Robert B. Keiter, Public Lands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and
Practice in Perspective, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1127, 1159-61 (discussing Pinchot's influence on
America's utilitarian model for natural resource policy). Pinchot had headed the Division of
Forestry within the United States Department of Agriculture since 1898, but did not gain
jurisdiction over the national forest reserves until 1905. See HAROLD T. PINKErr, GIFFORD
PINCHOT: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC FORESTER 47, 57-59 (1970).
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which lie within his province."33 A variant of Hand's policy proposal
was ratified by the Supreme Court when it held a federal district court
has inherent power to appoint an expert of its own choosing. 4
Though that power has been used sparingly, it has been used,
perhaps most famously by Judge Charles Wyzanski. He hired Carl
Kaysen, an economist, to be his law clerk for United States v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp.,36 the Government's antitrust case against the
company that accounted for about 75% of the market for shoe-making
equipment.37 After two years of pretrial proceedings, the Judge
decided he would benefit from having an economist as his law clerk
and hired Kaysen, who was then an assistant professor of economics
at Harvard and who would become a very distinguished economist on
the faculty of Harvard and, later, of MIT.38 Kaysen reviewed the
transcripts and exhibits, discussed the trial with the judge two or three
times a week, and then, at the end of the trial, presented the Judge
with his analysis of the case.3 9
Enthusiasm for the use of technical experts continued into the
1960s when Professor Arthur Kantrowitz, a physicist, proposed a
"Science Court" to consider and answer questions of scientific fact
important to setting public policy.4 0 Kantrowitz's proposal gave the
33 Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,
15 HARV. L. REV. 40,56 (1901).
34 See Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-14 (1920) (holding district court did not
violate the Seventh Amendment when it appointed an auditor); see also FED. R. EVID. 706
(granting courts authority to appoint expert witnesses); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149,
154-57 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding district court did not abuse its discretion in appointing a
technical advisor to assist in calculating damages); Danville Tobacco Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner
Assocs., Inc., 333 F.2d 202, 208-09 (4th Cir. 1964) (holding the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require a master appointed by the district court to be a lawyer because the
master is not required to make any rulings of law); Scott v. Spanjer Bros., Inc., 298 F.2d 928,
930-31 (2d Cir. 1962) (approving trial court's practice of appointing impartial medical experts);
Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 941, 949-50 (1997) (detailing the history of court-appointed experts).
3 See FED. R. EvID. 706 advisory committee's note (noting the infrequency with which
experts are appointed and assuming that the court's ability to appoint an expert has decreased
the need for it to do so); JOE S. CECIL & THOMAS E. WLLGING., COURT-APPOINTED EXPERTS:
DEFINING THE ROLE OF EXPERTS APPOINTED UNDER FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 706, at 7-8
(1993) (describing results of a survey regarding the prevalence of court-appointed experts); see
also Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets Bias and
Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 78-79 (1998) (observing that use of court-appointed experts
varies between individual judges).
36 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
37 Id. at 343.
38 See Carl Kaysen, In Memoriam: Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., 100 HARV. L. REV. 713,
713-15 (1987).
3 Id. at 714. Kaysen's economic analysis became a matter of public record because he
later wrote a book about it. See CARL KAYSEN, UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY
CORPORATION. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956).
4 See Research in the Service of Man: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Res. of
the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 90th Cong. 256-60 (1967) (statement of Dr. Arthur
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whole idea of scientific advisers for courts a great deal of
prominence. Then in 1975 the Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 4 1  Rule 706 of which provided guidelines for the
appointment of expert witnesses by district courts. Rule 706
stimulated greater awareness of the district court's inherent power to
call upon independent experts.42
The process of appointment and the participation of neutral experts
in the federal district courts is no longer controversial. It is important
to realize, however, that when the district court appoints an expert, a
litigant may challenge the expert's testimony or even his credentials
at trial.43 The expert operates entirely within the confines of an open,
adversarial proceeding in which his views become part of the record
and are subject to objection and appeal. Contrast Judge Wyzanski's
use of his expert law clerk, whose input was ex parte."
During the trial, Judge Wyzanski rejected a challenge by United
Shoe to his employment of Professor Kaysen. The judge pointed out
Kantrowitz, Director, Avco-Everett Research Laboratory); see also Arthur Kantrowitz,
Proposal for an Institution for Scientific Judgment, 153 SCIENCE 763 (1967); James A. Martin,
The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REv. 1058, 1058, 1064-65 (1977) (discussing the
desirability of various approaches to a "Science Court").
41 Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. app. at 314
(2006)).
42 See FED. R. EvID. 706 advisory committee's note ("The inherent power of a trial judge
to appoint an expert of his own choosing is virtually unquestioned."). Several courts have held
the trial judge's inherent power goes beyond what Rule 706 authorizes, allowing the judge to
appoint technical advisors who, so long as they do not make findings of fact or present
evidence, are not subject to the constraints of Rule 706. See Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
972 F.2d 304, 308 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992); Reilly v. United States, 863 F.2d 149, 157-59 (1st Cir.
1988); see also Deason, supra note 35, at 79-81 (discussing the range of functions performed by
court-appointed experts); Improving Judicial Gatekeeping, supra note 34, at 949-50 (same).
4 See Lohnes v. Level 3 Commc'ns, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 60 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the
"district court appropriately disregarded [a] belatedly proffered [expert] affidavit" which
"deprived [the appellant] of the opportunity to depose the proposed expert, challenge his
credentials, solicit expert opinions of his own, or conduct expert-related discovery"); United
States v. Craven, 239 F.3d 91, 102-03 (1st Cir. 2001) (vacating sentence because by speaking
ex parte with court-appointed expert sentencing court deprived the Government of a "realistic
opportunity to challenge the expert's conclusions by cross-examination or otherwise").
44 Under the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, "[a] judge shall not initiate, permit, or
consider ex parte communications, or consider other communications made to the judge outside
the presence of the parties .. . concerning a pending or impending matter. . . ." MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.9(A). The commentary makes clear that this proscription "includes
communications with lawyers, law teachers, and other persons who are not participants in the
proceeding." Id. cmt. 3. Regardless of their status under this rule, it is clear technical advisors
may not perform core judicial functions. See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 256
(1957) (noting that special masters may not "displace the court"); Kimberly v. Arms, 129 U.S.
512, 524 (1889) (observing that a court may not "abdicate its duty to determine by its own
judgment the controversy presented"); Reilly, 863 F.2d at 157 ("Advisors of this sort are not
witnesses, and may not contribute evidence. Similarly, they are not judges, so they may not be
allowed to usurp the judicial function.").
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that he was not obliged to notify counsel when he read a book on
economics.45 It is a powerful point: a district judge is at liberty to read
what he wants, and he may go study economics if he gets a tough case
involving an economic issue.46 He may read a technical manual and,
of course, he may misinterpret it, particularly if he does not have the
help of an expert, whether his own or a party's. But unlike an
appointed expert, a book or a technical manual can only aid the judge
in making a decision; it cannot make it for him. The author of the
book is not aware of the particular facts and issues involved in a
specific case at the time of writing, so there is no danger the book
might suggest a resolution of the case that could supplant the court's
own reasoned judgment.4 7 Furthermore, it is worth noting that Judge
Wyzanski concluded after the fact that it would have been better to
have had an independent expert confer with each side in the presence
of the other, submit his report to both sides, and be subject to
cross-examination on the witness stand.48
Ill. PROPOSING INDEPENDENT EXPERTS IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS
In 1974, Judge Harold Leventhal wrote an important article on the
role of the courts in reviewing agency decisions with respect to the
environment. 4 9 He lamented particularly the technical knowledge gap
the D.C. Circuit faces, especially when reviewing actions of the
Environmental Protection Agency.50 Then as now, some EPA cases
were replete with scientific issues and hence most challenging for the
court.
In the final pages of his article, Judge Leventhal advanced the
following proposal:
What an appellate court needs, in my view, is an aide who is
not a witness so much as a kind of hybrid between a master
and a scientific law clerk, a scientific expert who might be
45 Kaysen, supra note 38, at 714.
46 See Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review of Complex Administrative Agency Decisions,
462 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 72, 81-82 (1982) (describing the methods judges use
to inform their decision making when faced with unfamiliar subjects).
47 With the advent of the Internet, legal commentary-even on still pending cases-is
increasingly available online. The ethical problems raised by judges consulting such sources is
discussed in Rachel C. Lee, Note, Ex Parte Blogging: The Legal Ethics of Supreme Court
Advocacy in the Internet Era, 61 STAN. L. REv. 1535, 1535 (2009) (arguing that "ex parte
blogging threatens the impartial administration of justice").
48 See Kaysen, supra note 38, at 714-15; see also Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., The Law of
Change, 38 N.M.Q. 5, 19-20 (1968).
49 See Harold Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REv. 509 (1974).
50 See id. at 532.
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available, at the call of the appellate court, not to give
evidence or resolve factual or technical issues, but to advise a
court so that it could better understand the record.
Admittedly, upon first reading, that seems innocuous enough. In the
same vein, the judge went on to say, "The expert could be drawn from
the scientific community at large or from a pool of scientific aides
established for exclusive use of the courts."52 Although Judge
Leventhal acknowledged that the independent expert might have an
excessive influence upon an appellate judge, he was undisturbed by
that possibility because the court sits in panels of three, so there
would still be a diversity of perspectives brought to bear even upon a
technical issue. 3 It is unclear how much consolation that is, however,
if all the judges are to rely upon the same expert, a possibility Judge
Leventhal did not seem to consider.
Judge Leventhal also explained that because an appellate court,
unlike a trial court, does not engage in fact-finding and "determines
only whether there is a rational and legitimate basis for the resolution
of the facts by others," an expert's influence would be far from
decisive.54 For these reasons, he concluded, "[t]he appellate court ...
may rely on the general guidance of an aid, his translation, as it were,
from a recondite language, without having to accept advice on
whether a given view of the factual issues is 'correct' or not."55
Judge Leventhal's proposal took root neither in the courts nor in
the academy,5 6 but the idea of appellate courts retaining independent
experts has found a recent adherent in Justice Stephen Breyer. He has
long been a fan of independent experts in the district courts,
suggesting in his concurrence to General Electric Co. v. Joiner57 that
experts could "help [trial courts] overcome the inherent difficulty of
making determinations about complicated scientific, or otherwise
51 Id. at 550.
52 Id. at 552.
53 See id. at 554.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 But cf Sheldon L. Trubatch, Inforned Judicial Decisionmaking: A Suggestion for a
Judicial Office for Understanding Science and Technology, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 255,
264-67 (1985) (proposing creation of a judicial agency that would provide technical
memoranda to appellate judges); Joel Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power
and the Need for Institutional Refonn, 94 HARv. L. REv. 489, 555-57 (1981) (proposing the
Congress establish "a committee of scientists, engineers, and lawyers to act as standing masters
in complex environmental cases," to whom questions would be referred by the federal courts of
appeals, and who would make findings with regard to technical issues subject to "clearly
erroneous" review, and "suggest standants for technical analysis within the administrative
agencies" (footnotes omitted)).
57 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
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technical, evidence."5 Justice Breyer has written also in support of
efforts to create a national register of experts in order to make it easier
for judges to find and to appoint technical advisers.59
More recently, Justice Breyer revived Judge Leventhal's call for
the appointment of experts by appellate courts.60 In the context in
which he was speaking, it was economics rather than the physical
sciences that led Justice Breyer back to the idea of a court-appointed
expert on appeal, but for analytic purposes there is no important
distinction between the two fields. Lamenting "the difficulty of
maintaining some form of judicial review in highly technical subject
matter areas-such as telecommunications and information
technology-that implicate sophisticated economic reasoning," 6 1 he
went on to say:
Suppose it were easier for courts to retain their own experts in
such matters, perhaps experts suggested by the parties, who
would retain the right to supplement the views of any such
experts with expert views of their own. Might such a system
increase the courts' ability to determine, for example, the
outer bounds of what is reasonable in technical subject matter
areas? I do not say that the Supreme Court should retain its
own experts, even in highly complex technical cases. But the
lower courts, not just trial courts but also appellate courts,
might do so on occasion in a range of cases involving
scientific and other technical subject matter.62
As detailed below, there are five reasons I think not.
IV. WHY APPELLATE COURTS SHOULD NOT USE INDEPENDENT
EXPERTS
Judge Leventhal and Justice Breyer has each been, in his own
time, among the leading intellectual lights of the law. Indeed, in the
field of administrative law, they are truly firsts among equals, which
is why I take their proposal seriously. Nonetheless, I believe their
5 Id. at 149.
5 See Stephen Breyer, The Interdependence of Science and Law, 82 JUDICATURE 24, 27
(1998) (observing such a register "will provide a slate of candidates to serve as court-appointed
experts in cases in which the court has determined that the traditional means of clarifying issues
. . . are unlikely to yield the information that is necessary for a reasoned and principled
resolution of the disputed issues").
6 See Stephen Breyer, Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review, AEI-Brookings Joint
Center 2003 Distinguished Lecture 12 (Dec. 4, 2003), available at http://www.aeibrookings.
org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=840.
61 Id. at 11.
62 Id. at 12.
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proposal to give appellate judges independent access to experts is
mistaken.
First. The idea of an independent court-appointed expert is
antithetical to the adversary process at the heart of our common law
legal system. Evidence is submitted to the court in the presence of
all parties. The party with the more persuasive case prevails. Unlike a
judge in the inquisitorial system of the civil law used throughout
Europe,6 a common law judge does not conduct his own
investigation. When a common law trial or appellate court engages in
ex parte contacts, it departs from the adversary process and, hence,
risks compromising the fairness of the proceedings.6 5 That is why
such contacts with courts are generally prohibited, even while they
are permitted in agency proceedings.
Federal Rule of Evidence 706, as mentioned above, specifically
provides for court-appointed, independent experts to serve as
witnesses on the record of an adversarial proceeding in the trial court.
It therefore provides no support for the Leventhal and Breyer
proposals, in which an expert employed by an appellate court would
have no contact with the parties and would communicate with the
court off the record and in confidence. In short, according to the
proposal, the expert's advice would be neither known to, nor subject
to challenge by, the litigants.
The idea of the court receiving ex parte advice from an expert can
be deeply troubling to the parties. In the Microsoft case, the court of
appeals considered having an independent expert speak to the judges
prior to oral argument about the fundamentals of computer
technology. 67 Although the parties agreed such a session could be
beneficial, they were concerned the expert would touch upon issues in
63 By the common-law system, I refer not only to the law derived solely from judicial
decisions; the United States has a common-law approach to statutory law as well. See Antonin
Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAw 3, 13 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
6 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO.
L.J. 1983, 2006-11 (1999) (contrasting the inquisitorial approach, in which a judge gathers and
sifts through the evidence, with the adversarial approach, in which the parties perform those
tasks).
65 See supra note 44 (setting forth the canons of judicial conduct, which prohibit a judge
from initiating, permitting, or considering ex parte contacts).
6 See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 57 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("[I]nformal
contacts between agencies and the public are the 'bread and butter' of the process of
administration and are completely appropriate so long as they do not frustrate judicial review or
raise serious questions of fairness.").
67 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-5213 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 2000) (notice
advising parties of proposed review session on fundamentals of automation and requesting
responses to proposal).
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the case and they therefore asked to preview the proposed
presentation.68 As a result the court decided not to hear from an expert
after all.69 Had we proceeded as the parties suggested, we probably
would have created, at the appellate level, a mini-trial in which much
of what was said would be challenged by one side or the other.
As the Microsoft experience illustrates, independent experts would
intrude into and undermine the adversary system. The parties will
either object altogether-and with reason-to the possibility of the
court receiving ex parte information or, in their attempt to ameliorate
the potentially adverse effect of any such information, will make the
use of an independent expert more trouble than it is worth.
Second. An independent expert advising the judges off the record
might unduly influence the appellate court. In a complex case, the
judges may defer substantially to the explanations they receive from
the court-appointed expert; indeed, there would be little point in
appointing an expert if the judges did not do so. These experts are not
authorized under Article III of the Constitution to exercise the
"judicial Power of the United States"; they are neither subject to the
nomination and confirmation process nor vested with the life tenure
and salary protections deemed critical to the independence of the
judiciary, yet they would influence the outcome of cases and may
effectively decide them.
Judge Leventhal alluded to this problem but maintained that "a
system which enhances understanding by the judge is preferable to
one in which the judge must grab, or stab, at a record that seems to be
important but which incorporates confusing and extraneous
impressions.,,7 0 But Judge Leventhal failed to appreciate that
independent experts will undoubtedly do more than simply help the
appellate court to understand the record. In most, if not all, instances
they will inevitably provide subjective advice and judgment.
Suppose the appellate court hears a patent infringement case
involving a dispute over the design of a hydraulic pump. Judges
lacking a scientific or an engineering background-which is to say,
all but a few judges-will not know how a hydraulic pump works.
For the court to employ an expert to explain how the pump works
would not raise the concern of undue influence. The expert would
68 See Plaintiffs' Joint Response to the Court's Request for the Parties' Views Regarding
the Proposed Review Session at 1, 6, Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (No. 00-5213), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f6700/6830.pdf.
69 See Microsoft, No. 00-5213 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 18, 2000) (informing the parties that, upon
consideration of their responses, the Court had decided not to proceed with the proposed review
session).
70 Leventhal, supra note 49, at 553.
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simply be conveying general, objectively verifiable knowledge, i.e.,
facts about the hydraulic pump. The judge could just as well find that
information in a book or, more likely today, on the Internet."
The difficult cases, however, and the only ones of interest in
evaluating this proposal, task judges with exercising their judgment
with respect to issues of scientific, mechanical, or economic
feasibility-that is, issues upon which experts disagree. That is why
the record in such cases is replete with contradictory expert
testimony. Each side has engaged its expert precisely because there is
room for disagreement. The role of the court-retained expert on
appeal would be to help the judges sort out and resolve conflicts
between the parties' respective experts. Even if the court's experts
were nominally limited to explaining the undisputed facts and the
grounds for the conflicts, those explanations often would drift
inexorably into controversial territory.
Microsoft again comes to mind. Deciding whether Microsoft had
in fact impeded the ability of competitors to offer an efficient
alternative to Internet Explorer required the court to make a judgment.
The record contained the opposing views of the experts testifying for
the parties,7 2 but there was no objectively correct answer that a neutral
computer science expert could have given the court. Unlike the
explanation of the hydraulic pump, neutral experts likely would not
converge upon the same answer. The issue, like most scientific and
technical issues raised in court, was one of degree and of levels of
confidence. Under the proposals of Judge Leventhal and Justice
Breyer, therefore, the appellate court would end up employing the
independent expert not only for his knowledge but also for his
judgment.
A recurring situation is one in which an administrative agency,
such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, believes a regulated industry
could alter its processes or products in order to achieve some
regulatory goal, such as decreasing tailpipe emissions or increasing
fuel economy. The initial problem is that firms in the industry have
superior access to and understanding of the information relevant to
their own operations and products. Although the agency might be able
71 See, e.g., Hydraulic Pumps-Part 1, http//www.hydraulicspneumatics.com/200/FPE/
Pumps/ArticleTnie/6401/Pumps (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) (explaining the mechanics of
hydraulic pumps); Hydrostatic Pumps, http://www.hydraulic-equipment-manufacturers.com
/hydraulic-articlesl.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2010) (same); see also Wald, supra note 46, at
81-82 (noting judges have constant access to written publications that may assist them in
resolving technical questions).
72 See 253 F.3d at 65-66 (noting "contradictory testimony in the record").
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to overcome that disparity by acquiring its own in-house expertise,
neither the agency nor the regulated firms themselves will know by
how much or by when the firms could do better. So, while the EPA
contends certain improvements are feasible within a certain time and
the industry argues they are not, nobody knows for sure.73 When the
issue is the feasibility of a proposed regulation, it is not necessarily an
explanation of the facts, but the proper inference to be drawn from the
facts, that the court would want from an expert. That often demands a
subjective judgment and perhaps the weighing of competing values.
How promising is the technology the agency claims the industry
should be pursuing? Does it require trading some safety for some fuel
economy and, if so, how much? The independent expert's ex parte
communication, untested in the crucible of the adversary system,
might unduly influence the judge's answer to those questions.
To be sure, a law clerk's communication with a judge is ex parte,
and the law clerk could also have an undue influence upon the judge's
thinking, especially if that clerk has the technical training the judge
lacks. The critical difference is that if a law clerk does exert an undue
influence, it is owing to a failure on the part of the judge and to a
passing or happenstance event. It is episodic and not by design or
intent, not a systemic flaw in the way judges come to understand their
cases. Independent experts, on the other hand, would be hired
precisely in order to provide expert advice and, therefore, the risk of
their unduly influencing the court is much greater.74
Third. Independent experts undercut agency expertise and
accountability. The hallmark of U.S. regulatory law is the deference
that appellate courts show administrative agencies in most cases. In
matters of statutory interpretation, there is Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,' in which the Supreme
Court held that courts are to defer to an agency's interpretation of the
statute it administers if that statute is at all ambiguous and the
agency's interpretation is even a "permissible" one. In nearly all
other regards, courts apply another indulgent standard of review,
73 I wrote about this asymmetry of information in the auto industry in 1980. Nothing has
changed. Compare Douglas H. Ginsburg, Making Automobile Regulation Work: Policy Options
and a Proposal, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 83 (1979), reprinted in GOVERNMENT,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE 10-34 (Douglas H. Ginsburg & William
J. Abernathy eds., 1980) (automobile manufacturers may collude to present "uniformly
pessimistic view of the possibilities for technological innovation"), with Nat'1 Petrochemical &
Refiners Ass'n v. EPA, 287 F.3d 1130, 1136-43 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (discussing the EPA's lack of
information about automobile manufacturer's ability to comply with emissions requirements).
74 See Deason, supra note 35, at 140-41.
75 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
76 Id. at 842-43.
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asking only whether the decision of the agency was arbitrary or
capriciousn or unsupported by substantial evidence.78
These standards are thought to enhance both the efficiency and the
legitimacy of government, or more specifically, of the Executive
Branch, which relies heavily upon specialized agencies to administer
statutes and to issue technical regulations. The agencies, of course,
develop expertise in the field or the industry they are charged with
regulating. Allowing the appellate courts to employ independent
experts would lead those courts to substitute their own views, or more
probably their own experts' views, for those of the agency and the
agency's experts.
There is another, sometimes more important, reason appellate
courts defer to agencies. Administrative decision making often
involves a choice among competing values and reflects the policy
preferences of the incumbent administration.79 A good example is the
National Labor Relations Board, which was established in 1935 with
the passage of the National Labor Relations Act.80 The genius of the
Act was to proceduralize what theretofore had been violent labor
disputes, getting them out of the streets, literally, and into hearing
rooms where the parties could tell their stories and let their lawyers
do their fighting for them.81 The Labor Board routinely makes
decisions about whether an election in which the employees
ostensibly voted for or against having a union was conducted fairly,
that is, without "interference" or "coercion"-economic or
psychological-by the union or the employer. 82 But is the Board
really an expert on the psychology of employees or on election
propaganda? The empirical evidence suggests the decisions of the
Board reflect more the majority's partisan views than any expert
insight into the psychology of voters in union elections, and that is
why the Board's position on these matters changes whenever the
n See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).
78 See id. § 706(2)(E). "Substantial evidence" is not as high a standard as a
"preponderance." See Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966) (describing
the substantial evidence standard as "something less than the weight of the evidence"); Patricia
M. wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1371, 1391 (1995) (noting substantial evidence review of agency decision making "may
be much less than a preponderance of evidence").
7 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
80 Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 3, 49 Stat. 449, 451 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §
153 (2006)).
81 See Paul H. Sanders, Some Comments on Labor Dispute Settlement Processes, 27
VAND. L. REv. 5, 12-13 (1974) (laws such as the NLRA divert conflict "from physical violence
and economic coercion into the very serious 'war game' we call collective bargaining").
8* See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (b)(1) (2006) (identifying unfair labor practices by
employers and unions).
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political party in the majority changes.83 The Board has changed its
position three and four times on some very specific questions of what
is coercive in electoral labor law.84 Because the NLRB and other
agencies, unlike courts, are accountable, albeit indirectly, to the
democratic process through the election of the President and the
Senate (who, respectively, nominate and confirm agency heads), the
deferential standard of judicial review lets the agencies, rather than
the courts, choose among competing values.
In technical cases involving economics or the physical sciences the
applicable statute may require this weighing of competing and often
wholly incommensurable values. The Federal Power Act, for
example, provides that when deciding whether to license a
hydroelectric power project, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission,
in addition to the power and development purposes for which
licenses are issued, shall give equal consideration to the
purposes of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of
damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife . . . , the
protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation
of other aspects of environmental quality.
3 See Julius G. Getman & Stephen B. Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39
U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 682 (1972) ('The assumption that the Board has the ability to assess the
actual impact of employer-or union-conduct is a fiction."); Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Our
Nation's Forgotten Workers: The Unprotected Volunteers, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 147,
164-65 n.92 (2006) (highlighting the Board's changing attitude over whether graduate students
may be considered employees, and providing additional authority that suggests the political
nature of the Board); Ronald Turner, Ideological Voting on the National Labor Relations Board,
8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 707, 708-09 (2006) (noting studies and the author's experiences,
both of which indicate "the ideology of a Board member can serve as a predictive indicator of
that member's vote" (footnote omitted)); cf William N. Cooke et al., The Determinants of
NLRB Decision-making Revisited, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 237, 241, 254-55 (1995)
(concluding political preference influences a relatively small number of "important and complex
cases"). But see Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not as Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct,
Institutional Collegiality, and the National Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 51,
52 (2004) (arguing the NLRB is a "collegial administrative body whose adjudications are not
significantly tainted by the blight of political bias").
84 See Midland Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 263 N.L.R.B. 127, 129-30 (1982) (noting a history of
reversals and counter-reversals with respect to regulation of misleading campaign propaganda
and then reversing the standard itself); see also Turner, supra note 83, at 717-52 (providing
examples of issues in which the political ideology of NLRB members has noticeably shaped the
outcome of the Board's decision).
8 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2006). For another mixture of conflicting values see the
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (listing often conflicting goals of
"mak[ing] available . .. to all the people of the United States .. .a rapid, efficient, Nation-wide,
and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges, [assisting] the national defense,... [and] promoting safety of life and property through
the use of wire and radio communications").
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How the agency can give equal consideration to these
incommensurable values is a mystery known only to a self-deluding
Commissioner. More to the present point, how could a reviewing
court determine whether to accept the agency's claim to have done
so? Under current doctrine, the reviewing court defers to the agency's
determination if the agency tells a plausible story consistent with the
statute and the record.8 6 If the court were to employ an expert, either
he would have nothing important to say, or he would tell his own
story from his own point of view, which might not be consistent with
that told by the agency tasked with making the unavoidable tradeoffs
between, in this example, more power versus more environmental
quality. By law, the story told by the court's expert would be
irrelevant so long as the agency's story was plausible; yet, having
retained the expert, the court would likely focus upon the expert's
assessment rather than upon the limited scope of its authority to
review the agency's determination.
In a 1977 article, then Chief Judge David Bazelon questioned
some of the features of the "Science Court" proposal mentioned
above.87 In particular, he cautioned against interference with agency
expertise and value judgment:
[W]here administrative decisions on scientific issues are
concerned, it makes no sense to rely upon the courts ... to
substitute their own value preferences for those of the agency,
to which the legislature has presumably delegated the
decisional power and responsibility.
Employing experts is an invitation for the court to do just that.
Fourth. Independent experts undermine the virtues, such as they
are, of a generalist judiciary. Some states have specialized courts,
such as the separate Texas courts for criminal and for civil appeals 89
and the Delaware Chancery Court. 90 In contrast, the jurisdiction of the
8 See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2529-30
(2007) (stating that an agency decision is not vacated unless the agency "has relied on factors
which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect
of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the
product of agency expertise" (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
8 See David L. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 817 (1977).
8 Id. at 822.
8 See TEx. CONST. art. V., § 3 (describing separate final appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and of the Court of Criminal Appeals).
9 See id. (noting the Chancery Court is able to act quickly on corporate governance
matters because it does not hear criminal or civil tort cases).
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U.S. Courts of Appeals is defined geographically-except for that of
the Federal Circuit, which hears appeals from district courts
throughout the country in patent cases and a few other specified
subjects. 91 Every other federal court of appeals, from the D.C. Circuit
to the First to the Eleventh, accordingly hears cases in virtually every
field of federal law and, in diversity cases, fields governed by state
law.92 The D.C. Circuit, for example, hears federal criminal matters,
as well as federal and D.C. civil cases, and reviews rulemakings and
adjudications from virtually every federal agency and department
except the Executive Office for Immigration Review.
Federal appellate judges are therefore necessarily generalists.
Some of them, maybe most, have particular interests and perhaps
expertise in a particular area of the law, usually because they
practiced in that area before going on the bench. Nonetheless, every
judge on the court of appeals (and in the federal trial courts) is
expected to hear and decide any type of case that comes before him.
There are some advantages to this system, which is most likely
why we retain it despite periodic proposals for more specialized
courts.93 One of the advantages is that neither the bar nor the bench
may "hide behind specialized vocabulary and 'insider' concerns." 94
Members of the bar are forced to explain complex legal and technical
issues in a manner intelligible to a generalist judge who, in turn, is
tasked with authoring an opinion the parties and the public can
understand.95 This whole process engenders a needed clarity and
transparency in the law. Twenty-five years ago, Anthony Oettinger,
the director of Harvard's Program on Information Technology Policy,
told me that whenever he needed a description of a complicated
technical matter, he would look not to trade publications, nor
scientific or technical journals, but to the law reports. There, he found
generalist judges, aided by the briefs of high-priced lawyers,
described the technology with precision, but also with a clarity that a
layperson could understand.
A general docket also enables the judges to see the similarities
among different fields of law, which facilitates the "cross-fertilization
91 See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2006) (setting forth jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit).
92 See Diane P. Wood, Generalist Judges in a Specialized World, 50 SMU L. REv. 1755,
1755-59, 1763 (1997) (discussing the breadth of cases that a federal judge oversees).
93 One such proposal, which came from the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judicial
Improvements, was to create within the Circuits specialized panels on which certain judges
would serve for three years and hear only, for instance, energy regulatory cases. See ABA
Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, The United States Courts of Appeals:
Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, 125 F.R.D. 523, 544-46 (1989).
94 Wood, supra note 92, at 1767.
9 Id.
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of ideas."96 For example, there is no question the technology of
telecommunications is completely different from that of any energy
industry; yet, a judge exposed to both energy and telecommunications
regulation might see they have more in common than a specialist in
either field might ever have realized. Much as local telephone
companies have been required to make elements of their networks
available for lease by competitors on a non-discriminatory basis, 97
natural gas pipelines too have been required to operate as common
carriers, serving all shippers, including competing producers, upon
the same terms as their own affiliated producers.98 It is therefore
unsurprising that, in writing opinions in either field, the D.C. Circuit
finds occasion to cite decisions arising from the other industry. In
fact, as the court noted in one FCC case, "sections of the
Communications Act are, in large part, identical to the analogous
provisions of the Natural Gas Act."99 As a result, familiarity with
decisions under one statute may inform the court's understanding of
the other.
Generalist judges may even see opportunities for cross-fertilization
between industries that are not subject to similar regulatory
regimes.'0 Many of the problems across regulated industries are the
same, a fact that would not be noticed except by one familiar with
several regulatory regimes. If an appellate judge were to rely upon an
expert familiar with the economics or the technology of one specific
industry, then he would be more likely to miss useful parallels that he
would, as a generalist, otherwise see.
9 Id.
9 See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2006); see also Covad Commc'ns Co. v. FCC, 450 F.3d
528, 531-33 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (discussing requirements for unbundling telecommunication
service offerings under the Telecommunications Act).
9 See Nat'l Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831, 833-36 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(discussing the common carrier requirements of the Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C.
§ 717c(b)(1) (2006)).
9 Las Cruces TV Cable v. FCC, 645 F.2d 1041, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1981). This is not
surprising; the Communications and Natural Gas Acts trace their lineage back to the Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379, which was the basic template for the regulation of
network industries that persists, at least in general outline, to this day. See Las Cruces, 645 F.2d
at 1047.
10 Richard A. Epstein, in comparing the pharmaceutical industry, with its "patent
monopolies," to the telecommunications sector, with its "network monopolies," wrote: "In terms
of product line, few industries could be more disparate than the pharmaceutical and
telecommunications industries. But despite the differences in their products, their uneasy
relationship to state power is remarkably similar. Competitive solutions do not work with either
patents or network industries." Richard A. Epstein, Justified Monopolies: Regulating
Pharmaceuticals and Telecommunications, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 103, 125 (2005) (footnote
omitted).
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The generalist judiciary also provides a safeguard against
"regulatory capture."'O1 Because experts are by their nature
specialized, they are likely to be more susceptible to capture by the
regulated industry's point of view than is a federal judge, who has to
decide cases arising under a number of industry-specific regimes as
well as those that raise issues common to all industries. Generalist
judges are unlikely to have social or professional ties to parties or
industries before the court, are unconcerned about future employment
in the regulated industry, and are not subject to industry assumptions
and biases. They therefore bring to cases both an outsider's
perspective and the independence of mind to challenge established
practices or orthodoxies that a specialized expert might lack.
Fifth. The idea of having experts assist appellate courts is likely
impractical. As Judge Leventhal pointed out 10 2 and Justice Breyer
seems to imply,10 3 there are several ways the courts of appeals could
gain access to experts. Leventhal believed the best way was to go
outside the judiciary, perhaps to a pool comprising those
recommended by, for example, the National Academy of Science.
This sourcing issue highlights the threshold problem of knowing
what kind of "expert" one wants. Consider a telecommunications or
electric utility case in which the court is charged with determining
whether rates approved by the FCC or by the FERC for leasing
unbundled elements of an incumbent's network to competitors are
reasonable. Should the court hire a telecommunications or an
electrical engineer, respectively, or an economist, a cost accountant,
or a financial analyst? The parties' own choice of experts will not
always be a guide; the parties may have engaged experts in several
fields when making their record before the agency, but the issues on
review are usually narrower than those before the agency, leaving the
court to determine for itself in which field it needs to engage its own
expert. To surmount that initial hurdle would itself seem to require a
certain amount of expertise by the judges to identify the problem as,
for example, one of cost accounting as opposed to engineering or
economics.
The New England Journal of Medicine identified a related problem
in an amicus brief filed with the Supreme Court:
101 See Wood, supra note 92, at 1767.
1o2 See Leventhal, supra note 49, at 552 (discussing possibilities).
03 See Breyer, Economic Reasoning and Judicial Review, supra note 60, at 12 (wondering
whether an appellant court would be more inclined to use an expert if one were more readily
available).
'See Leventhal, supra note 49, at 552.
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A court's emphasis on the qualifications of expert witnesses
is very different from the standards of science, in which ad
hominem considerations are minimized. Scientists are trained
to look at the strength of the data, not the credentials of the
researcher. 05
In choosing an expert to assist them, generalist judges would have no
alternative to looking at the candidates' credentials; the judges are by
hypothesis in no position to evaluate the quality of the experts'
publications.
Finally, the very idea of an expert is arguably misplaced in fields
where there are varying schools of thought; if there is no consensus
approach among the experts, then how are judges to choose whom to
appoint? One from each school of thought? That just recreates the
adversary process, but does so at an arcane level of discourse and off
the record. As President Franklin Roosevelt, whose cabinet was
referred to as a brain trust, lamented: "There are as many opinions as
there are experts . .. ."'06
CONCLUSION
The English novelist Samuel Butler remarked "the public . . .
though they do not know enough to be experts, yet know enough to
decide between them."1 0 7 In this respect, a generalist judiciary is very
much like the public it serves. Appellate courts do not need to acquire
technical expertise of their own by hiring experts. They need only to
refine their skill at determining whether the agency whose decisions
they are reviewing exercised care and reason when choosing among
the views of competing experts.
In sum, I believe Judge Leventhal's and Justice Breyer's proposals
to bring experts into the appellate process would do more harm than
good. To be sure, judicial review in the administrative state imposes a
significant challenge to the generalist judge. But I am more confident
that judges are up to the challenge than I am that court-retained
experts can somehow be fitted into the adversary system on appeal.
15Brief of Amici Curiae The New England Journal of Medicine & Marcia Angell, M.D.,
in Support of Neither Petitioners Nor Respondents at 17, Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136
(1997) (No. 96-188).
1o6 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Radio Appeal on the Scrap Rubber Campaign (June 12, 1942),
in II THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 270, 272 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1950).
10 Samuel Butler, Formers of Opinion, in FURTHER EXTRACTS FROM THE NOTE-BOOKS OF
SAMUEL BUTLER 81-82 (Augustus Theodore Bartholomew ed., 1934).
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